Kalabagh Dam: The Roadmap To A National Consensus -- By: Athar Osama

President Musharraf's address to the nation on January 17, 2005 seems to have diverted an imminent national crisis in the inter-provincial and center-province relationships. In his speech, while the President referred to Kalabagh Dam as the most feasible option, he announced that, in the interest of interprovincial harmony, work on Basha Dam would commence instead and a decision on Kalabagh Dam would follow in the years to come. An understanding of the technicalities of the two projects suggests that even if work on Basha Dam were to commence now, the construction of the actual dam would not begin before 2008 (primarily, because building Basha Dam would require first laying down a 300-km road upto the site of the dam) by which time the President hopes to build a consensus to start the construction on KBD as well.

In effect, there is a likelihood that the work on the actual construction of KBD might begin before that of the Basha Dam. Initial response to the President's address seems to be positive so far with smaller provinces hailing his decision to back off from his earlier stance of building KBD immediately and at all cost. Political rather than efficiency considerations seem to have prevailed, and rightly so. The President's latest remarks in which he adopted the "Kalabagh, at all costs" approach, however, sugggest that the Kalabagh issue is not very much alive but can still divide the nation. In my last article on the subject, I made a case for national reconciliation on the issue and suggested that the talk of compromising on Pakistan's territorial integrity is not only irresponsible but also premature and it doesn't help the provinces' cause either. In this article I would outline a roadmap for building a national consensus on the issue.

The Three Elements of a Consensus Building Process

While it is clear that the decision to build KBD has been deferred until a consensus can emerge, the project has not been completely abandoned. What would such a consensus look like? The history of consensus building in Pakistan is not very encouraging. In the past, consensus building has taken more of the form of arm-twisting and procrastinating rather than actual hard work that must be undertaken to bring the sides closer and bridging the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of an issue. Building a consensus would require concurrent action on three fronts: a) changing the culture of secrecy in the political affairs of the country and developing a way to hold a meaningful national dialogue; b) developing an atmosphere of trust and sacrifice among the large and smaller provinces in the country; and c) mentally preparing ourselves to sincerely accept whatever the ultimate consensus on the issue would be. Fullfiling these conditions of a consensus building process would be a challenge in an environment of mutual mistrust (between people and the rulers, between government and opposition, between military and civilian leaders, between provinces and the center, and between large and smaller provinces), however, this is something that must be undertaken at all costs. I would elaborate on each of these three steps in that order.

Removing the Culture of Secrecy and Lack of Transparency in National Policy-making

One example of how consensus building has been botched in the past is the issue of KBD itself that has been in the limbo for the last 3 decades despite repeated "half-hearted" attempts by governments to arrive at a consensus. There are several reasons for this, the most important of which is the secrecy and lack of transparency in the political culture of the country. Simply speaking, one cannot hope to build a consensus on anything--what to talk of an issue as explosive as KBD--when every deliberation on the issue is shrouded in secrecy. The very fact that the successive reports of the Committees on Water Resources were released only recently--a welcome step but one too late--is testament to the fact that the state has not trusted its own citizens for making an well-informed and wise decision on the subject. There can be no debate without adequate information and there can be no decision without a national debate.

This is not only counter productive to the declared aspiration of building a national consensus but also provides an unchallenged opportunity to ill-meaning ultra-nationalists to bread further doubt and hatred among the provincial populations. The only thing one can actually build under secrecy is doubt, distrust, and paranoia which is what have at our hands after three decades of so called consensus building on Kalabagh Dam. If a consensus on KBD is to emerge over the next few years, the first thing that needs to happen is that this culture of secrecy and transparency must go. The establishment must not only learn to trust its own citizens to make the right decision for the country but also to humbly accept their judgement on the matter (more on this later).

Getting rid of the culture of secrecy and transparency and holding a national dialogue on the issue is not only important in its own right--because it is the right thing to do--but also because it paves way for the second element of the consensus building process i.e. confidence building and a give-and-take between the various stakeholders. The latter can only be effective and enforceable if it is carried out in a transparent manner--unlike the government opposition agreements that have never been made public in the past--so that all parties can be held accountable for their words. Equal access to information would help ensure that everybody, including the public, really understands the stakes involved and are thus able to negotiate freely. With a general level of public awareness present, politicians on either side would not be able to create artificial deadlocks in the deliberations by spreading misleading information to their respective constituents. Use of third-party trusted consultants may help in developing a semi-consensus on the facts of the case. For example's several report coming out of Sindh cite a number of international experts in the area of dam construction and irrigation etc. It would not hurt the center's cause of actually get those very experts to come over to Pakistan and give public expert testimony on the the issue.

Building an Atmosphere of Trust Between Stakeholders

In the context of Kalabagh Dam, the key stakeholders clearly are the governments and people of the three smaller provinces (i.e. Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan) on the one side and the one large province (Punjab) on the other with center playing the referee. Solving the KBD issue amicably would, however, require a lot more than providing true and accurate (technical) information on the issue. That the element of interprovincial mistrust is a driving factor in this case is quite evident from even a cursory review of the projects' technical features.

For example, one of the major objections raised by Sindh is that there is no water in the Indus to be stored in the KBD. Repeatedly, nationalist politicians and analysts have provided historical record of water flow through the Indus and painting doomsday scenarios of severe water shortages and resultant drought and soil erosion that would befall the province if any additional water was to be taken away. Yet, when it comes to Basha Dam, Sindhi politicians and technical experts have no problems of water shortage despite the fact that Basha Dam would also be built on Indus. If there is really no water for KBD, how come there is ample water for Basha?

Clearly, the issue goes far beyond pure technical feasibility and merit and the real underlying problem is the mistrust among the provinces. The politicians of Sindh, and to some extent NWFP, are simply not willing to give Punjab access to water to draw from AND at the same time the control of the water reservoir itself. Building Basha, instead of KBD, would probably ensure some separation between the control of the reservoir and the use of the water itself thus somewhat reducing Sindh's fears that Punjab may use water to blackmail or coerce it at some critical juncture in future. While this sentiment isn't healthy for a union like ours, it is somewhat understandable given the history of interprovincial relations in Pakistan. It is also something we must all strive to address at our earliest.

Assuming, for a moment, that building all dams (including KBD) is indeed essential to Pakistan's survival, what can be done to alleviate some of the fears and apprehensions of the smaller provinces vis-a-vis the larger province? President's speech has put several proposals on the table, including constitutional guarantees, moving the headquarters of ISRA, nominating additional ISRA representatives from Sindh etc. Many of these are worthy of consideration and are likely to atleast lessen some of the concerns raised by Sindh. However, it would help if active steps could be put into force now to inculcate a spirit of confidence building and sacrifice among the provinces. Building trust between provinces is a long-term and ongoing endeavor and the earlier we start the better it would be.

The essence of democracy is the process of give-and-take that happens between various provinces or states or between center and the provinces. Many times in a democratic order, one option/condition is good for one set of provinces but is not good for others and what is good for the latter is not good for the former. When such is the case, the collective welfare of the individual units can only be maximized by engaging in a give-and-take, in a democratic and honorable manner. That is what parents do when their children are at odd with each other. It is also a process that happens in every happy political union, regardless of its maturity and inclination. This process of give-and-take, however, must happen between true political leadership of the provinces.

It is conceivable that everything is "on the table" and in the end KBD could really become an opportunity to solve many more problems between the provinces than is normally conceived. For example, Punjab may offer to accede to Sindh's demands on NFC in exchange for latters willingness to go along with KBD; the center might address the issue of royalty on gas revenues in Baluchistan's favor to bring the latter on board; and NWFP might get a package to improve its irrigation system in return for its acceptance. These alone can lead to endless combinations through which a deal may be reached and hence the possibility to transform a potentially contentious issue into an opportunity to build a more perfect union may be realized.

Learning to Respect the Consensus When It Emerges

The final element of a true and fair consensus building process is the respect of the process and the ultimate outcome thus achieved. What this really means is that the stakeholders start the process with a clean slate, be sincere to the process itself, and vow to respect the outcome of the process. In the context of the KBD debate, what this would mean is that every option, including not building the dam at all or doing other things ( e.g. improving the efficiency of the irrigation system) instead or prior to the dam, is on the table. There would always be stakeholders who would ardently believe in the fact that the dam must be built and those who would believe the opposite. Pre-judging or ordaining the end result of the process would render it unfair and botched in the eyes of one of the two parties. It is therefore critical that facts and democratic give-and-take between provinces be allowed to take place in a manner that is seen as fair to all sides.

If the President's claim that Kalabagh Dam is not only beneficial for all provinces and is critical to Pakistan's survival is indeed true, one would be patient enough to let that become self-evident as an outcome of the process rather than be imposed as pre-condition to it. I am reminded here of a chapter in American history where the founding fathers--despite knowing that a break from Britain was inevitable and in the best interest of all states--waiting as long as it took for all thirteen colonies to be convinced of the fact without duress before signing the famous Declaration of Independence. Did it mean that the American revolution was put on hold for a while before a true consensus could emerge? Probably yes. But it also made sure that once that decision was made, it was followed in letter and spirit by all parties involved.

Similarly, if the fears of the smaller provinces are justified, they would either be addressed as a part of the process or would end up dictating the outcome of the process. The respect of the process also requires that, irrespective of the outcome, at the end both (or all) parties are mature enough to walk away from the exercise without any prejudice to anyone and a feeling that they have given the proposition a fair chance and would now accept the collective will of the Pakistani people. This and this alone would ensure that, regardless of the final outcome, Pakistan is made better off as a result of the process than without it.

Herein lies the greatest lesson that Pakistani people and politicians can derive from the KBD episode. A happy and harmonious union has a better chance of realizing the potential of the Pakistani nation than one frought with mistrust and doubts. A nation's political effectiveness is the product of doing the right thing and doing it well. Building KBD without the emergence of the proper consensus (as outlined above)--even though it maybe the right thing to do--would jeopradize our ability to do it well anyways. Hopefully, however, this would not happen and a democratic process of true consensus building and reconciliation would bring the entire nation to common ground and, with or without KBD, Pakistan and Pakistanis would move forward to take on the challenges of the twenty-first century with greater confidence and resolve than ever before.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com) is a Doctoral Fellow in Public Policy at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School for Public Policy in Santa Monica, CA.