Rethinking US-Pakistan Partnership -- By: Athar Osama

In my last article on the subject (published in Dawn, April 25, 2006), I discussed the underlying factors that have brought about what is perceived to be the latest about-face in the US-Pakistan relationship. I concluded that the US-Pakistan relationship is fraught with perverse incentives for political leadership on both sides. These perverse incentives force these leaders to emphasize temporary gratification rather than seeking to secure the long-term interests of their people. I argue that this approach to international relations has done more harm than good and takes the focus away from what is really important and beneficial for the American and Pakistani people.

In this article, I would present a scenario that builds upon an alternate foundation for (re)building the US-Pakistan relationship—one that moves beyond the notions of narrow-minded and myopic personal dependencies between leaders and attempts to develop a broad-based support and understanding of each others' interests, actions, and, limitations. Rethinking the very foundations of the US-Pakistan relationship is critical to developing the case for a new US-Pakistan strategic partnership—one that should have been the centerpiece of Pakistan's policy towards the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 but was clearly not.

America's perception of Pakistan—and by that same token, Pakistan's perception of America—is based on many stereotypes—often portrayed by the media in the two countries—that portray the two peoples at cross purpose to each other. The American public—thanks to the western media—only knows the Pakistani people as savages—dagger drawing, slogan chanting, flag burning fanatics—who are out to destroy America. The Pakistani public's perception of America—again, thanks to the local media—is shaped by America's policies towards rest of the world.

Neither of these visions is a true reflection of the reality and nothing can be farther from the truth than the fact that the two peoples have no basis to build a relationship upon. Beneath the brouhaha of the political posturing there is considerable affinity between Pakistanis and Americans at the people-to-people level. Anybody who has met the other in a context divorced of political connotations could testify to that fact.

While individual Pakistanis might disagree vehemently with American policy towards Pakistan or the rest of the Islamic world, in the same way as more than half of the Americans or Britons do so too, when it comes to people-to-people contacts between Pakistanis and Americans, there is little hostility and much affinity. If the recent experiences of American aid workers supporting earthquake relief in Pakistan suggest anything, it is that Pakistan and the United States have a lot to work with at the people-to-people level.

This really provides a foundation on which the rationale for a long-lasting win-win relationship between the people of the two countries can be built. To be win-win, this relationship must provide for the long term interests of both American and Pakistani people without taking away from each.

I am convinced that such a relationship can and must be built and that it would be mutually beneficial to not only the peoples of the two countries but also long term peace and stability of the world.

The world has entered a very dangerous phase of its geo-political history. The clash of civilizations is all but imminent. In fact, it is already underway and is likely to only deepen with the passage of time. Under this new form of conflict, we are much more likely to confuse our moral compass, lose a sense of our friends and foes, and abandon old rules of the game, hence doing irreparable damage to the international legal regime and our own long-term interests as well. In fact, we have already begun to experience that and the trend is likely to only worsen into a never-ending senseless spiral of global chaos unless arrested in its early stages.

I am convinced that a US-Pakistan strategic partnership—based on mutual respect and understanding of each others' interests, challenges and limitations—can be instrumental in arresting this trend and can serve as an example for similar partnerships elsewhere. It can, however, only be built through the activism and hard work of the respective people who must provide the courage, vision, and leadership to bring about such a partnership.

Making a case for US-Pakistan strategic partnership would first require setting the ultimate objectives from this relationship. Why would Americans want to have a long-standing relationship with Pakistan? What long-term interest does it serve for the United States to pay more than a footnote worth of attention to Pakistan's interests? Conversely, why should a Pakistani care about what the interests of American people are?

In the world of realpolitik, the two countries—and their people—must adopt a policy that serves their own interests well without being subservient to each others' interests. This can only happen if their self interests are perceived as aligned, or are at least overlapping, to each others' interests. I believe the latter to be the case, although, for much of their joint histories, this case has not been adequately made or sustained by political leaders on both sides.

In fact, I would argue, that both Pakistan and America have paid for the consequences of not realizing how intertwined their interests are in certain respects.

The US turnabout at the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s was a classic example of the ill-effects of such short-term and myopic thinking as was Pakistan's attempt to seek "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by aligning itself with the tyrannical Taliban regime. Neither of these decisions was informed by a broader meaning and understanding of each others' long-term interests. The first created Al-Qaeda while the second provided them with a platform to operate.

The central thesis of my argument is that it was indeed in the self-interest of both countries—and their people—to pay more than cursory attention to their relationship. Had it not been the case neither of the countries would have found themselves in the mess that they are in today.

This was as true in 1980s and 1990s as it is today where once again the leaders on both sides are playing a dangerous game—"milk'em and leave'em" for the US and "make hay while it lasts" for Pakistan— that could result in yet another faux pas. We can certainly do better and doing so would most definitely be in the best interests of the people of both America and Pakistan.

Once again, Pakistan—for better or worse--is not only a key frontline state in what is often described as the War on Terrorism but also an important—one of the most important, perhaps—Muslim countries in the world. It is the second largest country, by population, in the Islamic world and the sixth largest in the entire world.

Pakistan is also—for no fault of its own—at the center stage of one of the world's most dangerous nuclear flashpoints badly stuck between a battle of regional supremacy between China and India. Yet, at the same time, Pakistan represents a key element not in the US vision of a stable and prosperous world but also that of a progressive Islam that is not at odds with the rest of the world.

In many respects Pakistan represents opportunities for achieving these objectives that other countries do not. All its follies aside, and there are many, Pakistan still remains one of the very few Islamic countries outside the South East Asian belt where there is an active struggle between democracy and dictatorship, and if the latter continues to succeed it only does so because it serves the myopic interests of the western political leaders and home grown civilian and military dictators.

It serves nobody's long-term interests and may even be counter productive to "fear" Pakistani people and keep them in check. Only engagement, rather than containment, can be a viable strategy to deal with people genuinely interested in and seeking freedom and democracy for themselves.

Secondly, barring personal political differences with the individual in question, Pakistan was the first, and thus far the only, Muslim country around the world that had elected a female prime minister to office--a feat that even eludes the American political experiment so far. It is also the Muslim country with the largest number of women parliamentarians—perhaps more than many of the more enlightened and liberal western democracies in the world.

While there still remains a vast amount of work that needs to be done to completely bring women at par with men, Pakistan is way ahead of the much of the Islamic world in terms of women's rights. Here, once again, it would certainly help the cause if Pakistan were to remain a player in the international global order rather than become a pariah state as it has been for much of the 1990s.

By far, Pakistan is one living experiment that must succeed if the progressive vision of an Islamic state is to become a reality in the 21 st century. While the Pakistani people labor to realize that goal, it would certainly help if they did not face a task made further complicated by the roller coaster trends in US support.

There is considerable room for thinking about and building a long-term strategic partnership between US and Pakistan that more accurately represents the intertwined interests of the two people than one that is aimed at seeking short-term gratification from each other. It would require much hard work, courage, vision, and leadership by the respective people to bring about such a partnership. It may, however, be an investment that is most likely to pay handsome dividends for the two countries and the rest of the world.

This is a case that still needs to be made in America. It is also one that Pakistan's current rulers—for reasons outlined in my earlier article—have failed to make.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com ) is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, CA.