Repairing Pakistan's Image Abroad -- By: Athar Osama

In my last article on the subject (Dawn, May 22, 2006) I outlined a case for a new partnership between the peoples of United States and Pakistan—one that depends on a more grass roots support and understanding of each other's interests, realities, and limitations and that is devoid of the ill-effects of short-term perverse incentives of the political leaderships on both sides. I highlighted the fact that developing such a partnership would require hard work, activism, and leadership of peoples on both sides.

While there certainly is a need for action and reciprocation from both sides, the immediate impetus for action must come from Pakistan and Pakistanis. One may argue that it is us who need a principled US support for engaging productively with the rest of the world, not only in a political sense but also from an economic standpoint, as well as for a host of our other causes, not the least important of which is our security concerns arising on both eastern and western flanks.

How does one begin to develop a solid foundation for grassroots influence in America, in particular, and the west, in general? The answer lies in the clear understanding of what the image and influence game is all about and how it can and must be played to our benefit.

The post-9/11 political environment in the western capitals is best described by an ex-colleague of mine, Dr. David Ronfeldt at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica. "It's the battle of the story", David told me in the days and weeks after the 9/11, "and the final victory would be based on who is able to win the war of ideas, not weapons." While David was clearly referring to the US War on Terrorism against Al-Qaeda, Perhaps Pakistan's war against negative perception in the west is no different either. When perceptions become reality and perceptions matter, we clearly have a battle of ideas at our hands—one that we seem to be least prepared and equipped to win.

In this battle of ideas, substantive and sustained engagement at people-to-people level is the name of the game. Doing so would require taking a positive message directly to the American people and making a cogent case for a new US-Pakistan partnership. This would require hardwork, courage, and a lot of persistence. It would also require a vision and imagination followed with seamless execution.

Is Pakistan winning the "battle of the story" in the world's capitals? Is it even putting up a good fight? Are we investing in ideas? Even a cursory observer of Pakistan's foreign policy thrusts, successes, and failures over the years would conclude neither of the above to be true.

Clearly, Pakistan's foreign policy establishment is virtually clueless vis-à-vis the true nature of the influence game and hence is caught up in firefighting from one public relations crisis to the next. In other words, we are doing the tactical at the expense of the strategic—harm reduction instead of proactive campaigning—when it comes to marketing Pakistan's image abroad. While the Pakistani American community has just begun to make some inroads into the influence game, their efforts are woefully inadequate, haphazard, and under-resourced.

Developing a grass roots support for Pakistan and repairing Pakistan's image abroad would require sustained action at three different levels.

First, at the level of individual Pakistanis, we must present and radiate a positive optimistic message to the rest of the world. This does not mean that we must be either apologetic or oblivious of Pakistan's failings but that we, in our individual capacities, do not do anything to harm the country's image. Pakistanis living abroad must act as lone ambassadors of their country and most of them do so with dignity and style.

Many in the West only know Pakistan through an individual Pakistani that they are acquainted with and often their perception of Pakistan can be shaped by how that individual conducts him or herself. There is a tendency among Pakistanis after 9/11 to withdraw from public eye, adopt low-key profile, and not to attract too much attention. Alternatively, many Pakistanis have found themselves in a position of being too apologetic for things that they—and majority of other Pakistanis— have not even done. This can be counterproductive to Pakistan's image and we must take steps to reach out to Americans and show them the positive face of Pakistan as well.

As professionals as well, the competence with which we carry ourselves sends a message to our colleagues and superiors about Pakistan. Nothing has succeeded more in building India's image than India Inc. and India Inc. did not succeed until Indians succeeded in the US. Same holds good for Pakistan and Pakistanis. However, Pakistan Inc. would never come through if majority of Pakistani businessmen and entrepreneurs would prefer to "pass through" unnoticed as "South Asian" operations of an unknown foreign company. This is a hard choice to make for Pakistani business leaders abroad but it is one with a catch-22 dilemma attached to it.

Second, at the level of Pakistani-Americans, we must be agents of political change at home and abroad. While more recently, Pakistanis have begun to enter professions of influence—politics, media, academia, and public policy etc.—their numbers are minute as compared to the demands of the tasks at hand. Pakistanis need to do more and be more willing to pursue careers in professions of influence.

Traditionally, Pakistani Americans have also been very skeptical and negative of their home country. For understandable reasons, mentioning of Pakistan doesn't quite excite the same kind of optimism and passion among Pakistani Americans that India excites among NRIs. While the Indians are proud of their identity and confident of their destiny in the world, the opposite holds true for us Pakistanis.

In what is yet another catch-22 situation, we can't realistically be hopeful of Pakistan's future unless things—political, social, and economic—take a turn towards the better at home and that would not happen until Pakistanis around the world engage meaningfully with their country. I always say, we can't hope to change Pakistan's politics until good educated people engage with Pakistan's political scene en mass. Pakistanis living abroad are a key source of hope in that respect. However, they must move from being armchair strategists, commentators, and opportunists to well-meaning political activists and agents of change. In short, they must learn to put their money where their mouth is.

The final actor in shaping Pakistan's image abroad is the Government of Pakistan itself. In many ways every sitting government has been a liability in that regard and one that has negatively shaped the perception and actions of Pakistanis and Pakistani Americans towards Pakistan. The current government is no exception. It can hardly be good news for Pakistan's image abroad when governance and politics becomes a shameless power grab for a few and the collective sensibilities of the people are ruthlessly brushed aside for the latter's benefit.

Similarly when a country's de-facto political leader makes a ridiculously irresponsible and wrong-minded statement that not only hurts the sensibilities and dignity of women in Pakistan but is also utterly non-representative of Pakistani situation, the struggle for resurrecting Pakistan's image becomes all the more steep for the rest of us.

Not only must the government of Pakistan refrain from becoming a part of the problem, it must clean house and become a part of the solution. This requires, once again, understanding the dynamics of the influence game and investing wisely in Pakistan's image abroad. A three pronged strategy that successively addresses key elements—the three Ms, namely, Mind, Media, and Money—of the ideas pipeline is likely to do the trick.

The battle for the hearts and minds of the west begins with the war of ideas in the western mind. Anybody who has experienced the western intellectual scene can testify to the tremendous premium on the battle of ideas that wages in hundreds of universities, non-profits, and think tanks around the United States and rest of the world. Ever wondered about how much Tom Freidman, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and Alvin Toffler and thousands of other intellectuals have done to shape the westerner's world (and their perception of it)? Yet, how well does Pakistan engage with this breed of "image makers"?

Today, more than 20 Indians serve as deans at American colleges and Universities and many more as professors and educators. How many do we have? How much research do we fund in America that is likely to have a multiplier effect on what is being said and how much is being said about Pakistan? I am sure we do not do any and that's where our image marketing efforts must start. Everything else comes secondary.

Only when we have begun to generate enough intellectual capital to knock at the American mind does the media enter the picture. For long, Pakistanis have attempted to engage with the American media by sponsoring full-page advertisements and doing letter writing campaigns etc. All that is good and noble but it is not likely to work in an intellectual vacuum for we must be able to back up our media effort by solid ideas that attract to sensibilities of American people. In fact, once a critical mass of ideas and idea-champions is available, media automatically picks up on the debate and amplifies the effect. A targeted, well-thought-out, and well-resourced media strategy is important but it must have a solid intellectual foundation to build upon.

Finally, money is an important enabler if not a decider in this game of influence. Money's influence can be indirect ( e.g. in bankrolling other aspects of the strategy) and direct (e.g. political contributions and lobbying fees etc.) GOP's strategy thus far has been to invest, albeit sparingly, in some political lobbying in the West but not in a systematic effort to develop grass roots support for Pakistan. These efforts are short-term, at best, and worthlessly ceremonial, at worst and they do not lead to grass roots support for Pakistan. GOP and high net-worth Pakistani Americans must invest in areas that are likely to deliver long-term and permanent benefits, such as, research, media, and grass roots organizations.

Clearly, Pakistan has been attempting to engage with these elements (Mind, Media, and Money) of an image marketing strategy in precisely the reverse order. No wonder then that devoid of a solid intellectual foundation, our hardly glitzy media campaigns backfire and lobbying efforts fall flat on their face like a house of cards causing major embarrassment to Pakistanis abroad and at home.

I am confident that a comprehensive image strategy built along the lines suggested above and executed—with able hands on board—is likely to deliver the goods. We, Pakistanis, are definitely up to the challenge. It is only a matter of putting our collective energies into it and committing us to a course of action and—in the same breath—to a prosperous future of Pakistan.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com ) is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, CA.

Rethinking US-Pakistan Partnership -- By: Athar Osama

In my last article on the subject (published in Dawn, April 25, 2006), I discussed the underlying factors that have brought about what is perceived to be the latest about-face in the US-Pakistan relationship. I concluded that the US-Pakistan relationship is fraught with perverse incentives for political leadership on both sides. These perverse incentives force these leaders to emphasize temporary gratification rather than seeking to secure the long-term interests of their people. I argue that this approach to international relations has done more harm than good and takes the focus away from what is really important and beneficial for the American and Pakistani people.

In this article, I would present a scenario that builds upon an alternate foundation for (re)building the US-Pakistan relationship—one that moves beyond the notions of narrow-minded and myopic personal dependencies between leaders and attempts to develop a broad-based support and understanding of each others' interests, actions, and, limitations. Rethinking the very foundations of the US-Pakistan relationship is critical to developing the case for a new US-Pakistan strategic partnership—one that should have been the centerpiece of Pakistan's policy towards the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 but was clearly not.

America's perception of Pakistan—and by that same token, Pakistan's perception of America—is based on many stereotypes—often portrayed by the media in the two countries—that portray the two peoples at cross purpose to each other. The American public—thanks to the western media—only knows the Pakistani people as savages—dagger drawing, slogan chanting, flag burning fanatics—who are out to destroy America. The Pakistani public's perception of America—again, thanks to the local media—is shaped by America's policies towards rest of the world.

Neither of these visions is a true reflection of the reality and nothing can be farther from the truth than the fact that the two peoples have no basis to build a relationship upon. Beneath the brouhaha of the political posturing there is considerable affinity between Pakistanis and Americans at the people-to-people level. Anybody who has met the other in a context divorced of political connotations could testify to that fact.

While individual Pakistanis might disagree vehemently with American policy towards Pakistan or the rest of the Islamic world, in the same way as more than half of the Americans or Britons do so too, when it comes to people-to-people contacts between Pakistanis and Americans, there is little hostility and much affinity. If the recent experiences of American aid workers supporting earthquake relief in Pakistan suggest anything, it is that Pakistan and the United States have a lot to work with at the people-to-people level.

This really provides a foundation on which the rationale for a long-lasting win-win relationship between the people of the two countries can be built. To be win-win, this relationship must provide for the long term interests of both American and Pakistani people without taking away from each.

I am convinced that such a relationship can and must be built and that it would be mutually beneficial to not only the peoples of the two countries but also long term peace and stability of the world.

The world has entered a very dangerous phase of its geo-political history. The clash of civilizations is all but imminent. In fact, it is already underway and is likely to only deepen with the passage of time. Under this new form of conflict, we are much more likely to confuse our moral compass, lose a sense of our friends and foes, and abandon old rules of the game, hence doing irreparable damage to the international legal regime and our own long-term interests as well. In fact, we have already begun to experience that and the trend is likely to only worsen into a never-ending senseless spiral of global chaos unless arrested in its early stages.

I am convinced that a US-Pakistan strategic partnership—based on mutual respect and understanding of each others' interests, challenges and limitations—can be instrumental in arresting this trend and can serve as an example for similar partnerships elsewhere. It can, however, only be built through the activism and hard work of the respective people who must provide the courage, vision, and leadership to bring about such a partnership.

Making a case for US-Pakistan strategic partnership would first require setting the ultimate objectives from this relationship. Why would Americans want to have a long-standing relationship with Pakistan? What long-term interest does it serve for the United States to pay more than a footnote worth of attention to Pakistan's interests? Conversely, why should a Pakistani care about what the interests of American people are?

In the world of realpolitik, the two countries—and their people—must adopt a policy that serves their own interests well without being subservient to each others' interests. This can only happen if their self interests are perceived as aligned, or are at least overlapping, to each others' interests. I believe the latter to be the case, although, for much of their joint histories, this case has not been adequately made or sustained by political leaders on both sides.

In fact, I would argue, that both Pakistan and America have paid for the consequences of not realizing how intertwined their interests are in certain respects.

The US turnabout at the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s was a classic example of the ill-effects of such short-term and myopic thinking as was Pakistan's attempt to seek "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by aligning itself with the tyrannical Taliban regime. Neither of these decisions was informed by a broader meaning and understanding of each others' long-term interests. The first created Al-Qaeda while the second provided them with a platform to operate.

The central thesis of my argument is that it was indeed in the self-interest of both countries—and their people—to pay more than cursory attention to their relationship. Had it not been the case neither of the countries would have found themselves in the mess that they are in today.

This was as true in 1980s and 1990s as it is today where once again the leaders on both sides are playing a dangerous game—"milk'em and leave'em" for the US and "make hay while it lasts" for Pakistan— that could result in yet another faux pas. We can certainly do better and doing so would most definitely be in the best interests of the people of both America and Pakistan.

Once again, Pakistan—for better or worse--is not only a key frontline state in what is often described as the War on Terrorism but also an important—one of the most important, perhaps—Muslim countries in the world. It is the second largest country, by population, in the Islamic world and the sixth largest in the entire world.

Pakistan is also—for no fault of its own—at the center stage of one of the world's most dangerous nuclear flashpoints badly stuck between a battle of regional supremacy between China and India. Yet, at the same time, Pakistan represents a key element not in the US vision of a stable and prosperous world but also that of a progressive Islam that is not at odds with the rest of the world.

In many respects Pakistan represents opportunities for achieving these objectives that other countries do not. All its follies aside, and there are many, Pakistan still remains one of the very few Islamic countries outside the South East Asian belt where there is an active struggle between democracy and dictatorship, and if the latter continues to succeed it only does so because it serves the myopic interests of the western political leaders and home grown civilian and military dictators.

It serves nobody's long-term interests and may even be counter productive to "fear" Pakistani people and keep them in check. Only engagement, rather than containment, can be a viable strategy to deal with people genuinely interested in and seeking freedom and democracy for themselves.

Secondly, barring personal political differences with the individual in question, Pakistan was the first, and thus far the only, Muslim country around the world that had elected a female prime minister to office--a feat that even eludes the American political experiment so far. It is also the Muslim country with the largest number of women parliamentarians—perhaps more than many of the more enlightened and liberal western democracies in the world.

While there still remains a vast amount of work that needs to be done to completely bring women at par with men, Pakistan is way ahead of the much of the Islamic world in terms of women's rights. Here, once again, it would certainly help the cause if Pakistan were to remain a player in the international global order rather than become a pariah state as it has been for much of the 1990s.

By far, Pakistan is one living experiment that must succeed if the progressive vision of an Islamic state is to become a reality in the 21 st century. While the Pakistani people labor to realize that goal, it would certainly help if they did not face a task made further complicated by the roller coaster trends in US support.

There is considerable room for thinking about and building a long-term strategic partnership between US and Pakistan that more accurately represents the intertwined interests of the two people than one that is aimed at seeking short-term gratification from each other. It would require much hard work, courage, vision, and leadership by the respective people to bring about such a partnership. It may, however, be an investment that is most likely to pay handsome dividends for the two countries and the rest of the world.

This is a case that still needs to be made in America. It is also one that Pakistan's current rulers—for reasons outlined in my earlier article—have failed to make.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com ) is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, CA.

Bush's About Face on Pakistan: A Post Mortem -- By: Athar Osama

Bush's trip to South Asia last month has been the fodder for Pakistani, Indian, and American news media and security analysts for a while now.

In Pakistan, the editorials and opinion makers have focused on what appears to be the beginning of another case of the classic US about face on Pakistan—an about face we've become so accustomed to now. The country's security analysts and general public are cringing over the unceremonious manner in which Pakistan has fallen from grace. Musharraf's days of glory in western capitals, many are quick to predict, are virtually over.

For our neighbors on the east, however, Bush's visit to South Asia brought about a welcome and much anticipated strengthening of the US-India strategic relationship. Basking in the high praise bestowed upon their country, including being described as a democracy to follow, the Indian media has widely hailed the visit as historic and ground-breaking in many ways--most notably the signing of the controversial civilian nuclear deal which essentially provides the much sought legitimacy to India's decades old not-so-clandestine military nuclear program.

While the potential strategic implications of the Indian nuclear deal and the about face on Pakistan have been analyzed—in fact over analyzed—by news media and political commentators on both sides of the line of control, nobody on this side of the border has tried to shed light on what brought this about in the first place. Thoughtful self-reflection is not a virtue in ample supply in Islamabad. Using the current US about face as a case study, this article is dedicated to examining some of the reasons why we might have just lost yet another opportunity to substantively engage the United States in a manner that would safeguard the country's long-term interests in Washington.

Throughout its history and leading up to 9/11, Pakistan has been at the risk of being isolated and marginalized in the world. Emergency fire-fighting, rather than strategic planning and foresight, has been the hallmark of Pakistan's foreign policy for much of our history. Pakistan's policy reversal on Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—although probably the right thing to do was done not as a result of a proactive and realistic assessment of Pakistan's foreign policy objectives and the Afghan situation but as a reaction to severe pressure from Washington—is the latest case of this reactive fire-fighting in our recent history.

While there have been periods where the country has received some respectability within the West—primarily because of temporary alignment of interests of Pakistan's various military rulers and the certain western politicians—these instances have been largely fleeting and have failed to build a solid foundation for the continuation of this strategic alignment. Bush's recent love affair with Musharraf is clearly another one of these transitory alignments of interests and is likely to be as fleeting as similar periods in the past. The writing is already on the wall.

Pakistan's policy reversal post-9/11 provided Pakistan with some breathing space not only to avoid becoming a direct target of US' wrath but also an opportunity to develop a true understanding of its needs and limitation and a genuine basis for a long-term strategic partnership with the US. Unfortunately, the country's political leadership—Musharraf, Shaukat Aziz and other PML(Q) leaders—chose not to fully take advantage of this opportunity. To be fair, though, the United States, for reasons lying somewhere between outright paranoia and a strategic calculation of costs and benefits are equally to be faulted but then a superficial engagement with Pakistan serves America's interests much more than it serves Pakistan's, or it seems.

For the Bush administration, the rationale for not wanting to develop a foundation for a sustained relationship are quite straightforward. This is a diplomatic philosophy that the United States has successfully implemented in the past and continues to do so in much of the Islamic World. Engaging with and solving real issues requires real empathy to each others' viewpoints. It requires real hard work and, at times, considerable sacrifice. Building a long-lasting understanding between countries also requires a long-lasting understanding between peoples. All this hard work and unpredictability can be easily avoided if one can deal with military or civilian dictators who are willing to "control" their people and keep them in line with the US desires and objectives.

As long as the US gets a steady stream of Al-Qaeda suspects apprehended and whisked off to its bases in Afghanistan and Cuba, why would anyone want to care what Pakistani people think about the clear lack of due-process and infringement of their territorial integrity? This is a line of argumentation that tends to serve the short-term interests of the United States but may have significant long-term unintended consequences, especially on how the United States is perceived by people around the world.

While the decision is most likely to come back to haunt the US policymakers some day—as the decision to train and use Islamic fundamentalists to fight the proxy war with Soviet Union in Afghanistan now has—one can at least make a case that, if ones intention is to avoid doing the necessary hard work to build understanding and relationships, the current modus operandi at least provides a way to safeguard America's short term interests.

What about the motives and aspirations of the Pakistani leadership? Why would Pakistan not want to engage with the United States in a more meaningful manner? Why has it not undertaken the steps necessary to deepen its relationship and influence with Washington. Here, the situation is much more complex and multi-faceted. Several reasons can be advanced for why the country's ruling junta has failed to capture the opportunity we had post-9/11 to ensure that we were never put in the position to make that dreadful choice again.

The easy answer to the above questions hovers around the issues of inability and incompetence. The argument would go something like this. Pakistan's foreign policy establishment has simply failed to see the importance of putting together the foundations of a deeper relationship with Washington. Worse still, one might argue that they do not have the slightest clue of how to put such a relationship together. One can cite several pieces of evidence to support this hypothesis. The Washington watchers amongst us are amply aware of how little effort, in terms of the strategic not the tactical stuff, the Pakistani government and foreign policy apparatus has put in the last 5 years since 9/11. Sometimes one tends to wonder if the Pakistani foreign policy establishment even understands how things work in Washington. Other times it almost seems like they have resigned to the fact that they will forever remain what they are and do not even make the slightest attempt to change the status-quo. Either way they just don't seem to get it.

One can even add to this mix the various half-hearted and inadequately funded efforts by Pakistani American political organizations like PADF, AOPP,COPAA, Pak PAC etc. and the situation remains virtually the same. The well-meaning individuals running these organizations try to do their best but have failed to make any significant dent in Pakistan's stature in Washington. No wonder then that Pakistan's alliance with Washington today remains as fragile as the current about face suggests.

The more difficult, although equally plausible, answer to the above questions as well. One may argue that a broad-based and deep relationship between Islamabad and Washington is not in the best interest of the current ruling elite in Islamabad. Limiting the countries' alliance to a mere personal dependency between Bush and Musharraf's serves the latter's interest as it perpetuates the false impression that Musharraf is indispensable to the current geo-strategic alignment and hence is the only candidate for being Pakistan's savior-in-chief and hence the protector of Washington's interests in the region. This hypothesis is very much in line with Musharraf's refusal to take off his military uniform and put the country on the path to civilian leadership ("an Army Chief is the only person qualified to lead the country in current geo-political situation") and other actions such as non-democratically enacted constitutional amendments etc.

What this says to Washington's policymakers and political elite, and subsequently to the general US population, is that Pakistan is an unreliable partner in peace, that Pakistanis are undependable people, and that the only way to "tame" the country is to continue supporting military rule. Not only do the General and his men promote this viewpoint in Washington, but a vast majority of prominent Pakistani Americans and their political organizations have unfortunately bought into this philosophy. No wonder then that Washington's attitude towards Pakistan fluctuates so dramatically with the change of political-military guard in Islamabad.

What would a more sincere and visionary leadership have done instead? It would have used the time afforded to us in the aftermath of 9/11 to translate the personal chemistry between leaders into a permanent alliance between their countries. We could have spent the last five years reaching out to the American leaders, and directly to the American people (if need be), to impress upon them that Pakistani people are as normal, likeable, and peace-loving as any other people on the face of the earth and that, given certain reciprocation from the US, Pakistan can be depended upon as a long-term US ally. This could have been a much more powerful message than saying that US' only bet is to keep Musharraf in power because the day he goes Pakistan is going to disintegrate into chaos. We all know that's not true but that's precisely the message delivered by our political leadership in Washington.

Sustained partnerships and friendships between countries are never built on personal chemistry of leaders alone. Instead, they are built on principles and on mutual understanding between peoples. We have all but lost an opportunity to build one.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com ) is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, CA.

Freedom of Expression or Clash of Values? By: Athar Osama

The recent worldwide reaction against the publication of the objectionable cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad (Peace be Upon Him) has once again brought the wide gulf in the understanding between Islamic and western societies to the forefront of public debate.

Several commentators, including the Danish government, have suggested that this matter has been blown far out of proportions. They're absolutely right. It has indeed been blown far out of proportions by the easily incite-able Muslim mobs that have gone on a rampage through out the capitals in the Islamic world, targeting western embassies, symbols of western culture and, most ironically, the life and property of their own fellow citizens.

There is little that anyone can say in defense of what has been observed on the streets across much of the Muslim world in the recent weeks. The violent Muslim reaction does not seem to serve any purpose except cementing their own image as an extremist and emotional people, desperate enough to resort to unlawful means of conduct. Unfortunate actions of a very small minority Muslims thus end up defining the Muslim image and feeding a stereotype for the whole of Islam that cannot be farther from the truth.

While the Muslim reaction to the cartoon episode is mind-boggling, so is the European stance that had led to this provocation. Clearly, it was not the first publication of the cartoons--in September 2005 that attracted only minor, localized, and peaceful protests--but the repeat publication in other European newspapers--in clear and blatant defiance to the sensitivities of a billion-and-a-half Muslims around the world--that has resulted in what we are witnessing today.

Had the Europeans tackled the issue in an adroit and respectful manner that it was worthy of, it would have simply died down in due course of time but the Danish, and others, saw this as an opportunity to make a point or two about freedom of expression and here we are, once again, at the brink of a ever-growing gulf between Islam and the West. The choice of the subject as well as the timing couldn't have been more unfortunate. For our lack of collective judgment, Dr. Huntington would be a happy man today.

So why is this such a big deal for Islam?, one may ask. Being a Muslim myself, I can understand why Muslims around the world would find it offensive and hurtful to see their beloved and revered Prophet (PBUH) becoming an object of somebody's ill-conceived and misdirected mischief. Islam expressly prohibits rendering prophetic figures to graphical art for the fear of encouraging idol worshipping and also for pure respect of the prophets themselves. This not only applies to Islam's own Prophet but also to all prophets throughout history.

Creating highly provocative cartoons of such revered personalities is not only bad taste but also very bad satire. The editor of the Danish newspaper that started this episode in a CNN interview wondered why why Muslims can't see the intended message in these cartoons, while many Muslims seem to be thinking precisely what that intended message actually is? The Danes haven't gotten around to providing any satisfactory explanation or enlightenment on that issue and one cannot help but think that there isn't much to offer in that respect either.

This is clearly not just a freedom of expression issue. The writer Robert Fisk, in a recent piece on the subject, highlights the duplicity of standards that European governments are guilty of. He maintains, for example, that denial of or writing anything against the holocaust is prohibited by law in many European countries. In any case, if someone dares to do so, he or she would be immediately accused of anti-semitism and forced to retract and apologize. If the freedom of speech were absolute, as the Europeans seem to claim in this instance, it would have also applied to anti-semitism. But it doesn't and very rightly so.

In fact, the International Herald Tribune recently reported that the Danish Newspaper that published Prophet Mohammed's cartoons rejected a set of cartoons of Jesus Christ in 2003 on the pretext that they might affect the sensitivities of a vast number of people--Christians around the world. Why should a newspaper editor use a particular standard of self-censorship in one particular instance and a different standard in a different--yet very similar- instance. Similarly, the most recent publication of additional pictures from Abu Gharib abuse in some Australian newspaper seems to have attracted an irritated reaction from the Bush Administration that seems to view it as being highly inflammatory to Muslims' sensititives. Doesn't freedom of expression apply in this instance too?

In this day and age when the world faces the scrooge of international terrorism and building bridges of understanding between civilizations is the only way to fight it, the Europeans have embarked upon a quest that is bound to get all Muslims--not just extremists and fanatics--on the wrong side of this struggle. If one has no regard for the religious sensitivities of a billion-and-a-half Muslim population, how does one plan to convince them that it is not fighting a battle against their faith?

Even if it were an issue of freedom of expression, however, a little more common sense would have been helpful. The best way to protect freedom, an NPR commentator argued recently, is not to misuse it. Indeed, freedom of expression is a laudable value that many of us in the Muslim world positively identify with, exercise ourselves, and struggle to bring to our closed societies. However, we also know that our freedom ends where it impinges on others' freedoms and sensitivities.

Even in America, there are laws that make it possible for us to enjoy our freedoms while protecting others'. For example, it is nearly impossible for anyone to "freely" roam around displaying nudity because, although he/she might see it as a part of a freedom to express, others may not see it that way and by doing so in public he/she might cause grief and distress to others. That the freedom of expression is not an absolute concept is a lesson that now seems lost on the Europeans, in particular, and the west, in general.

This is clearly not an issue about the freedom of expression. It is in fact a very crude manifestation of a clash of values that has been seething beneath the surface for a while now. Europe clearly believes that freedom of expression is a sacred value worth fighting for but it must also understand that other civilizations and cultures also hold certain values as sacred and that they have every right to do so. A billion-and-a-half Muslims, for instance, hold the respect of Prophets--all Prophets, not just their own—at least as sacred as freedom of expression, if not more.

When these two sets of values clash, we have to find a way to accommodate both by reaching a solution that is respectful of each. Can Europe live without disrespecting Islam's Prophet (PBUH) or must indecency towards their Prophet (PBUH) be thrust down the throats of a billion-and-half Muslims as a necessary cost of life in the twenty-first century? Would respecting our prophets seriously jeopardize the freedom of expression in European societies? Would this achieve any meaningful purpose? The world--both Muslim and non-Muslim--must ask itself these questions and more.

Only by building bridges of understanding and respecting each others traditions and values can we co-exist despite our differences, conduct ourselves in this dangerous world, and build a better tomorrow for our future generations. What we really need is a compact that allows civilizations to peacefully co-exist as they enjoy their own freedoms. Every bit of this ambitious project is worth taking on. Episodes like these not only do not achieve anything, they only make the ultimate task more difficult.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com) is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica , CA.

India bid for OIC Membership: Threat or Opportunity? -- By: Athar Osama

King Abdullah's request to consider India's membership to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) during President Musharraf's recent trip to Saudi Arabia seems to have stunned Pakistan's Foreign Policy establishment. We have hardly heard anything except reactionary comments and a bunch of groans and guffs from the foreign office on the subject.

This is also not the first time such an option has been put on the table. Indeed, only a couple of years ago, Islamabad narrowly avoided a similar situation only after it threatened to withdraw from the OIC if India were admitted against the former's wishes.

This time, however, things might be different as not only has India become a much more influential and confident member of the world community but also, this time around, the request itself has come from an office that the Pakistanis might find very hard not to oblige.

Why is it then, that Pakistan's Foreign Policy establishment is outfoxed repeatedly on this issue while the Indians seem to be advancing their agenda forward with great perfection? To begin with, only very infrequently in the past has Pakistan's foreign policy establishment lived up to the challenges posed to them. Repeatedly in the past you would often find them fumbling for clear and workable answers to important questions, defendable positions on issues, and realistic strategies to advance Pakistan's interests abroad.

The double irony of the issue is that our foreign policy wonks cannot even claim to have not seen this coming. In recent years, certain group of countries with significant Muslim populations have stepped up the pressure on OIC to admit them as observers—and subsequently as full members--to the organization that boasts a membership of more than 50 countries with majority Muslim populations.

The reason often advanced by these countries, most notably India and Russia, is that a membership in the OIC would enable them to better serve the interests of their large and growing Muslim populations. This logic raises several interesting questions. How can a membership in an organization that has never really achieved anything in the four decades of its existence be of any value to countries like Russia or India?

For example, one really wonders how membership in OIC helps a country serve its population better? If Russia or India were to do anything positive for their Muslim populations, for example, the first place to start would be to improve the lives and well-being of Muslims in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Gujrat rather than to attempt to become a member of OIC. What, if any, are the true motives behind their eagerness to join the OIC?

The more likely--and thus far unstated--reason, however, seems to be that both Russia and India would like to play a more "active" role in the affairs of the OIC. While both of these countries have had a very strong behind the scenes presence in OIC's deliberations, primarily through their influence on several Arab members of the OIC, a formal membership in the organization would make that relationship both legal and permanent. This is most likely to further dilute OIC's already weak position on issues that do not resonate well with Russia and India, namely, Chechnya and Kashmir respectively.

For sure, it would probably be difficult for Pakistan or any other member of OIC to keep the floodgates closed for too long a time. The shifting global geopolitical dynamic and mood since 9/11 makes it almost necessary that the Islamic countries would have to open up to greater transparency in their dealings vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The million dollar question then is: whether and how would the OIC be able to safeguard and further the interests of the Muslims around the world? Who would be allowed to in and who would remain out? What would be the new emergent identity of the OIC?

Once the floodgates are flung wide open, for example, would Israel and the United States—being occupiers of large Muslim populations in Palestine and Iraq and hence having legitimate interests to represent the interests of their Muslim minorities, at least in principle—also be allowed to become members of the OIC? The OIC must address these questions in a proactive and definitive manner that is reflective of a confident and effective organization. This is especially true today as the OIC embarks on an effort to reform itself and become more relevant to the changing reality of Islam in the twenty-first century.

Consequently, there is a dire need for the Pakistani foreign policy establishment to move away from its fossilized mindset and think out-of-the-box. Only through creative thinking, meticulous execution, and visionary leadership can Pakistan and OIC transform this potential threat into an opportunity for its members and over one-and-a-half billion Muslims around the world. Wouldn't it be better if the Pakistani foreign policy establishment, instead of its usual deafening silence and defensive rhetoric, had responded to the challenge in a more proactive and realistic manner?

For example, a message that welcomed the aspirations of India and Russia to do better vis-à-vis the rights of their Muslim populations along with the desire to develop a set of objective criteria to facilitate and ensure that indeed that is exactly what was achieved would have gone a long way in making OIC a more effective platform for Muslims around the world.

Achieiving the above objective would have required developing and defending the case for expanding the membership of OIC (the rationale) beyond the Muslim majority countries that it is currently restricted to, designing an objective mechanism for deciding which countries to include or exclude (the eligibility criteria), and laying out a plan to smoothen the transition to a much larger OIC (the process).

Thankfully, there are examples for such arrangements that may provide some guidance in this endeavor. One of the ways to make OIC more meaningful to the collective well-being of the Muslim communities around the world is to use its membership as a bait to bring improvements to the lives of minority Muslim populations. For example, the OIC can adopt a criteria similar to the very comprehensive accession targets adopted by the European Union. Even before a country's application for admission into the EU is considered, it must fulfill an extensive set of qualitative and quantitative criteria ranging an array of economic, social, and political realms.

OIC too can, in principle, adopt a set of qualifying conditions that every non-Muslim (majority) country seeking an observer status must qualify before its application could be entertained by a newly formed Standing Committee on Memberships. These conditions might include meeting pre-specified targets on freedom of expression and religion, discrimination and islamophobia, human rights and liberty of Muslims, and parity in economic and social conditions of Muslims vs. non-Muslim populations etc.

As the applicant countries qualify a base-level eligibility criteria, they may be granted an observer status (based on recommendation of the standing committee and a majority vote of existing members). The observer status would allow these countries to observe OIC's activities and begin to contribute in certain areas of OIC's operations. The countries on observer status however, would remain on a watch-list by OIC for continued progress on the above set of criteria.

In five years time, observer members may become eligible for associate membership (based on a super-majority vote of existing members). The associate membership would allow these countries to contribute more fully in all activities of the OIC without having the right to vote.

In the final stage of the process, associate members, upon fulfilling an even tougher set of criteria and on unanimous recommendation of existing members, may graduate to full-membership with a right to vote.

A process like the one suggested above would allow OIC to objectively evaluate the applications for membership for countries without resorting to favoritism of one sort or the other. It would also provide an opportunity to the aspirants to demonstrate their own commitment and sincerity vis-a-vis using the opportunity to participate in the OIC in precisely the manner they claim they would i.e. to advance the interests and improve the lives and well-being of their Muslim populations.

Most importantly, however, it would make the OIC a more inclusive and effective group of countries (both Islamic and non-Muslim) that are serious in advancing an Islam-friendly foreign policy agenda and provide it with the appropriate leverage and policy influence beyond the 50-odd Islamic countries--something that it seriously lacks today. It would also provide the kind of collaborative and consultative platform focused on issues of relevance to Muslims around the world that is necessary to avoid the much-touted clash of civilizations between the Islamic and the Western world.


The author ( athar.osama@gmail.com ) is a Doctoral Fellow at Frederick S. Pardee – RAND Graduate School for Public Policy in Santa Monica, California.

Kalabagh Dam: The Roadmap To A National Consensus -- By: Athar Osama

President Musharraf's address to the nation on January 17, 2005 seems to have diverted an imminent national crisis in the inter-provincial and center-province relationships. In his speech, while the President referred to Kalabagh Dam as the most feasible option, he announced that, in the interest of interprovincial harmony, work on Basha Dam would commence instead and a decision on Kalabagh Dam would follow in the years to come. An understanding of the technicalities of the two projects suggests that even if work on Basha Dam were to commence now, the construction of the actual dam would not begin before 2008 (primarily, because building Basha Dam would require first laying down a 300-km road upto the site of the dam) by which time the President hopes to build a consensus to start the construction on KBD as well.

In effect, there is a likelihood that the work on the actual construction of KBD might begin before that of the Basha Dam. Initial response to the President's address seems to be positive so far with smaller provinces hailing his decision to back off from his earlier stance of building KBD immediately and at all cost. Political rather than efficiency considerations seem to have prevailed, and rightly so. The President's latest remarks in which he adopted the "Kalabagh, at all costs" approach, however, sugggest that the Kalabagh issue is not very much alive but can still divide the nation. In my last article on the subject, I made a case for national reconciliation on the issue and suggested that the talk of compromising on Pakistan's territorial integrity is not only irresponsible but also premature and it doesn't help the provinces' cause either. In this article I would outline a roadmap for building a national consensus on the issue.

The Three Elements of a Consensus Building Process

While it is clear that the decision to build KBD has been deferred until a consensus can emerge, the project has not been completely abandoned. What would such a consensus look like? The history of consensus building in Pakistan is not very encouraging. In the past, consensus building has taken more of the form of arm-twisting and procrastinating rather than actual hard work that must be undertaken to bring the sides closer and bridging the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of an issue. Building a consensus would require concurrent action on three fronts: a) changing the culture of secrecy in the political affairs of the country and developing a way to hold a meaningful national dialogue; b) developing an atmosphere of trust and sacrifice among the large and smaller provinces in the country; and c) mentally preparing ourselves to sincerely accept whatever the ultimate consensus on the issue would be. Fullfiling these conditions of a consensus building process would be a challenge in an environment of mutual mistrust (between people and the rulers, between government and opposition, between military and civilian leaders, between provinces and the center, and between large and smaller provinces), however, this is something that must be undertaken at all costs. I would elaborate on each of these three steps in that order.

Removing the Culture of Secrecy and Lack of Transparency in National Policy-making

One example of how consensus building has been botched in the past is the issue of KBD itself that has been in the limbo for the last 3 decades despite repeated "half-hearted" attempts by governments to arrive at a consensus. There are several reasons for this, the most important of which is the secrecy and lack of transparency in the political culture of the country. Simply speaking, one cannot hope to build a consensus on anything--what to talk of an issue as explosive as KBD--when every deliberation on the issue is shrouded in secrecy. The very fact that the successive reports of the Committees on Water Resources were released only recently--a welcome step but one too late--is testament to the fact that the state has not trusted its own citizens for making an well-informed and wise decision on the subject. There can be no debate without adequate information and there can be no decision without a national debate.

This is not only counter productive to the declared aspiration of building a national consensus but also provides an unchallenged opportunity to ill-meaning ultra-nationalists to bread further doubt and hatred among the provincial populations. The only thing one can actually build under secrecy is doubt, distrust, and paranoia which is what have at our hands after three decades of so called consensus building on Kalabagh Dam. If a consensus on KBD is to emerge over the next few years, the first thing that needs to happen is that this culture of secrecy and transparency must go. The establishment must not only learn to trust its own citizens to make the right decision for the country but also to humbly accept their judgement on the matter (more on this later).

Getting rid of the culture of secrecy and transparency and holding a national dialogue on the issue is not only important in its own right--because it is the right thing to do--but also because it paves way for the second element of the consensus building process i.e. confidence building and a give-and-take between the various stakeholders. The latter can only be effective and enforceable if it is carried out in a transparent manner--unlike the government opposition agreements that have never been made public in the past--so that all parties can be held accountable for their words. Equal access to information would help ensure that everybody, including the public, really understands the stakes involved and are thus able to negotiate freely. With a general level of public awareness present, politicians on either side would not be able to create artificial deadlocks in the deliberations by spreading misleading information to their respective constituents. Use of third-party trusted consultants may help in developing a semi-consensus on the facts of the case. For example's several report coming out of Sindh cite a number of international experts in the area of dam construction and irrigation etc. It would not hurt the center's cause of actually get those very experts to come over to Pakistan and give public expert testimony on the the issue.

Building an Atmosphere of Trust Between Stakeholders

In the context of Kalabagh Dam, the key stakeholders clearly are the governments and people of the three smaller provinces (i.e. Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan) on the one side and the one large province (Punjab) on the other with center playing the referee. Solving the KBD issue amicably would, however, require a lot more than providing true and accurate (technical) information on the issue. That the element of interprovincial mistrust is a driving factor in this case is quite evident from even a cursory review of the projects' technical features.

For example, one of the major objections raised by Sindh is that there is no water in the Indus to be stored in the KBD. Repeatedly, nationalist politicians and analysts have provided historical record of water flow through the Indus and painting doomsday scenarios of severe water shortages and resultant drought and soil erosion that would befall the province if any additional water was to be taken away. Yet, when it comes to Basha Dam, Sindhi politicians and technical experts have no problems of water shortage despite the fact that Basha Dam would also be built on Indus. If there is really no water for KBD, how come there is ample water for Basha?

Clearly, the issue goes far beyond pure technical feasibility and merit and the real underlying problem is the mistrust among the provinces. The politicians of Sindh, and to some extent NWFP, are simply not willing to give Punjab access to water to draw from AND at the same time the control of the water reservoir itself. Building Basha, instead of KBD, would probably ensure some separation between the control of the reservoir and the use of the water itself thus somewhat reducing Sindh's fears that Punjab may use water to blackmail or coerce it at some critical juncture in future. While this sentiment isn't healthy for a union like ours, it is somewhat understandable given the history of interprovincial relations in Pakistan. It is also something we must all strive to address at our earliest.

Assuming, for a moment, that building all dams (including KBD) is indeed essential to Pakistan's survival, what can be done to alleviate some of the fears and apprehensions of the smaller provinces vis-a-vis the larger province? President's speech has put several proposals on the table, including constitutional guarantees, moving the headquarters of ISRA, nominating additional ISRA representatives from Sindh etc. Many of these are worthy of consideration and are likely to atleast lessen some of the concerns raised by Sindh. However, it would help if active steps could be put into force now to inculcate a spirit of confidence building and sacrifice among the provinces. Building trust between provinces is a long-term and ongoing endeavor and the earlier we start the better it would be.

The essence of democracy is the process of give-and-take that happens between various provinces or states or between center and the provinces. Many times in a democratic order, one option/condition is good for one set of provinces but is not good for others and what is good for the latter is not good for the former. When such is the case, the collective welfare of the individual units can only be maximized by engaging in a give-and-take, in a democratic and honorable manner. That is what parents do when their children are at odd with each other. It is also a process that happens in every happy political union, regardless of its maturity and inclination. This process of give-and-take, however, must happen between true political leadership of the provinces.

It is conceivable that everything is "on the table" and in the end KBD could really become an opportunity to solve many more problems between the provinces than is normally conceived. For example, Punjab may offer to accede to Sindh's demands on NFC in exchange for latters willingness to go along with KBD; the center might address the issue of royalty on gas revenues in Baluchistan's favor to bring the latter on board; and NWFP might get a package to improve its irrigation system in return for its acceptance. These alone can lead to endless combinations through which a deal may be reached and hence the possibility to transform a potentially contentious issue into an opportunity to build a more perfect union may be realized.

Learning to Respect the Consensus When It Emerges

The final element of a true and fair consensus building process is the respect of the process and the ultimate outcome thus achieved. What this really means is that the stakeholders start the process with a clean slate, be sincere to the process itself, and vow to respect the outcome of the process. In the context of the KBD debate, what this would mean is that every option, including not building the dam at all or doing other things ( e.g. improving the efficiency of the irrigation system) instead or prior to the dam, is on the table. There would always be stakeholders who would ardently believe in the fact that the dam must be built and those who would believe the opposite. Pre-judging or ordaining the end result of the process would render it unfair and botched in the eyes of one of the two parties. It is therefore critical that facts and democratic give-and-take between provinces be allowed to take place in a manner that is seen as fair to all sides.

If the President's claim that Kalabagh Dam is not only beneficial for all provinces and is critical to Pakistan's survival is indeed true, one would be patient enough to let that become self-evident as an outcome of the process rather than be imposed as pre-condition to it. I am reminded here of a chapter in American history where the founding fathers--despite knowing that a break from Britain was inevitable and in the best interest of all states--waiting as long as it took for all thirteen colonies to be convinced of the fact without duress before signing the famous Declaration of Independence. Did it mean that the American revolution was put on hold for a while before a true consensus could emerge? Probably yes. But it also made sure that once that decision was made, it was followed in letter and spirit by all parties involved.

Similarly, if the fears of the smaller provinces are justified, they would either be addressed as a part of the process or would end up dictating the outcome of the process. The respect of the process also requires that, irrespective of the outcome, at the end both (or all) parties are mature enough to walk away from the exercise without any prejudice to anyone and a feeling that they have given the proposition a fair chance and would now accept the collective will of the Pakistani people. This and this alone would ensure that, regardless of the final outcome, Pakistan is made better off as a result of the process than without it.

Herein lies the greatest lesson that Pakistani people and politicians can derive from the KBD episode. A happy and harmonious union has a better chance of realizing the potential of the Pakistani nation than one frought with mistrust and doubts. A nation's political effectiveness is the product of doing the right thing and doing it well. Building KBD without the emergence of the proper consensus (as outlined above)--even though it maybe the right thing to do--would jeopradize our ability to do it well anyways. Hopefully, however, this would not happen and a democratic process of true consensus building and reconciliation would bring the entire nation to common ground and, with or without KBD, Pakistan and Pakistanis would move forward to take on the challenges of the twenty-first century with greater confidence and resolve than ever before.

The author (athar.osama@gmail.com) is a Doctoral Fellow in Public Policy at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School for Public Policy in Santa Monica, CA.

KBD & Pakistan's Territorial Integrity: Lessons from American Democracy - By: Athar Osama

The recent political and media drama over the Kalabagh Dam issue has once again brought fresh questions about Pakistan's territorial integrity to public debate. The smaller provinces, notably, Sindh and Baluchistan, are crying foul over their unhappy relationship with the larger province, Punjab, and blaming the Pubjab-dominated Federal Government of taking sides on the issue. The on-going military "non-operation" in Baluchistan is yet another thorne in the country's side that has the potential of exploding and creating further strain within the horizontal (inter-provincial) and vertical (provinces-federal) relationships in the country.

Repeatedly, provincial politicians--even those who are part of the current establishment--are issuing dire warnings of harm to the territorial integrity of Pakistan if the KBD were to be bulldozed through against the wishes of Sindh, Balunchistan, and NWFP--in essence, hinting at irrepreparable damage to the current geographical reality of Pakistan and giving wind to secesionist sentiments in the provinces. While some of this might just be hype created by opportunist nationalist politicians, there is certainly something amiss in the "unhappy" union called Pakistan.

The ongoing political drama leaves a terrible taste in ones mouth and makes one wonder, why is it that we, in Pakistan, are engaged in a zero-sum game where the federation can only gain at the expense of the provinces and the provinces at the expense of the federation? Why can't a citizen of Pakistan wear his/her dual indentities, Pakistani and a Sindhi-Baluchi-Pathan-Punjabi, with pride on his/her chest at the same time?

As we begin to ponder over this question and the resultant and emerging threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity (read as "dismemberment" or "secesion", yet again!), it would not be inappropriate to take a leaf from the history of republicanism in the united states of America. The American democratic experiment, despite all its short-comings--including a civil war after 70-odd years of declaring nationhood--represents one of the most happy if not the perfect union of several states in modern history, if not all human history. It is by far the one and only union of a continental scale that has strengthened with the passage of time while all others (e.g. the Roman or Islamic empires) have dwindled and evaporated in thin air.

In order to understand what brought the United States of America to come about and what keeps its going, it would be useful to revisit some of the early debates in American history. In 1776, when America's founding fathers declared independence from the English Crown, the American colonies consisted of 13 independent colonies--essentially "nations" with significantly different histories, cultures, political, and economic systems etc. The 1776 Articles of Confederation respected these differences and only loosely bound the 13 former colonies into a confederation for the purpose of the revolutionary war. The only thing common between the former colonies was their desire to throw off the British Raj. For everything else, they were independent countries of sorts. The Continental Congress was responsible for a joint foreign and war policy but had very limited say in actual governance or even the conduct of war. For example, while it made and approved plans for the war, it could only request the individual states to raise and contribute their share to the army but had no implementation authority of its own. This, as the Americans learnt over the course of the revolutionary war, was not enough.

As we begin to ponder over this question and the resultant and emerging threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity (read as "dismemberment" or "secesion", yet again!), it would not be inappropriate to take a leaf from the history of republicanism in the united states of America. The American democratic experiment, despite all its short-comings--including a civil war after 70-odd years of declaring nationhood--represents one of the most happy if not the perfect union of several states in modern history, if not all human history. It is by far the one and only union of a continental scale that has strengthened with the passage of time while all others ( e.g. the Roman or Islamic empires) have dwindled and evaporated in thin air.

In order to understand what brought the United States of America to come about and what keeps its going, it would be useful to revisit some of the early debates in American history. In 1776, when America's founding fathers declared independence from the English Crown, the American colonies consisted of 13 independent colonies--essentially "nations" with significantly different histories, cultures, political, and economic systems etc.

The 1776 Articles of Confederation respected these differences and only loosely bound the 13 former colonies into a confederation for the purpose of the revolutionary war. The only thing common between the former colonies was their desire to throw off the British Raj. For everything else, they were independent countries of sorts. The Continental Congress was responsible for a joint foreign and war policy but had very limited say in actual governance or even the conduct of war. For example, while it made and approved plans for the war, it could only request the individual states to raise and contribute their share to the army but had no implementation authority of its own. This, as the Americans learnt over the course of the revolutionary war, was not enough.

After the end of the revolutionary war which was won despite great odds and inspite of the considerable feet-dragging by several individual colonies, the American leaders felt the need to create a "more perfect union" that would closely bind the destinies of the 13 colonies together. In the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, these leaders decided to give their people a new constitution, in effect turning the united states of America into the United States of America.

The question, however, quickly arose vis-a-vis the legitimacy to enforce such an undertaking. Clearly, nobody in the existing governance structure had the authority to force this new constitution on the America. While the option of "forcing" the 13 colonies into a union was very faintly considered once, the consensus quickly emerged on the impracticality of that option. Even if somehow a union was forced on the people of the 13 colonies, it would have been a nightmare to sustain it in the future.

Under the existing legal regime (i.e. the Articles of Confederation) each individual colony (and its people) had the right to join or not to join such a union. Respecting their rights to do so, the task before the members of the constitutional convention was to get the proposed revisions ratified by each of the 13 former colonies before it could become a constitution of United States of America. Without at least 9 of the 13 colonies voting for the proposed system of government, there would be no constitution and hence no United States.

These ratification debates are curiously reflective of the sort of challenges that the Pakistani union faces today. The question before each of the 13 former colonies was whether or not to join the proposed union. With the republican and state sentiment high among the populations and their politicians, it wasn't an easy decision. The state nationalists were deeply skeptical of joining a union that would become as unresponsive and tyrannical to local people and their needs as the British Crown had been.

After the end of the revolutionary war which was won despite great odds and inspite of the considerable feet-dragging by several individual colonies, the American leaders felt the need to create a "more perfect union" that would closely bind the destinies of the 13 colonies together. In the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, these leaders decided to give their people a new constitution, in effect turning the united states of America into the United States of America.

The question, however, quickly arose vis-a-vis the legitimacy to enforce such an undertaking. Clearly, nobody in the existing governance structure had the authority to force this new constitution on the America. While the option of "forcing" the 13 colonies into a union was very faintly considered once, the consensus quickly emerged on the impracticality of that option. Even if somehow a union was forced on the people of the 13 colonies, it would have been a nightmare to sustain it in the future.

Under the existing legal regime (i.e. the Articles of Confederation) each individual colony (and its people) had the right to join or not to join such a union. Respecting their rights to do so, the task before the members of the constitutional convention was to get the proposed revisions ratified by each of the 13 former colonies before it could become a constitution of United States of America. Without at least 9 of the 13 colonies voting for the proposed system of government, there would be no constitution and hence no United States.

These ratification debates are curiously reflective of the sort of challenges that the Pakistani union faces today. The question before each of the 13 former colonies was whether or not to join the proposed union. With the republican and state sentiment high among the populations and their politicians, it wasn't an easy decision. The state nationalists were deeply skeptical of joining a union that would become as unresponsive and tyrannical to local people and their needs as the British Crown had been.

What would happen if the the Federal Government became yet another monarchy? What about the rights of smaller states in a union dominated by interests of the larger states? Would a federal government, acting on behalf of all colonies, be able to make wise and judicious decisions vis-a-vis regulation of continental natural resources (e.g. exploration and settlement of western lands).

These are similar to the questions being raised by the smaller Pakistani Provinces today and the Pakistani provincial and national political leaders as well as the people themselves could learn a lot from the ratification debates that considered the two realities of 13 different countries vs. one large continential country and the issues of state vs. federal rights. It is also instructive to see how the continental leaders softly treaded the precarious landscape, making compromises and reaching the desired outcome, while at the same time respecting the soverign rights of the people of each former colony.

The debate hovered around many facets of the issue. Those, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton (the Federalists), who had first experienced the difficulties of marshalling national resources (e.g. in the case of the revolutionary war) from a group of independent and soverign states that were not duty-bound to follow the federal government, argued in the favor of establishing a strong federal government, a national defense system, and a host of other administration instruments necessary to govern the vast expanse of the continent and fight another war--should England impose one on them. The contrary position was adopted by Thomas Jefferson and later James Madison (the anti-Federalists) who were staunchly in favor of state supremacy and rights and abhorred the notion of a strong federal government.

The "thirteen country" option, the Federalists argued, could result in the same geopolitical dynamic that marred intra-european relationships. What would stop these thirteen countries to start fighting from each other in the same way that European powers have been fighting with each other for centuries? What binds the people of these thirteen colonies with each other except the bond of a shared destiny against a common enemy and there was no reason to believe that it would remain so long after the end of the revolutionary war.


What would happen if the the Federal Government became yet another monarchy? What about the rights of smaller states in a union dominated by interests of the larger states? Would a federal government, acting on behalf of all colonies, be able to make wise and judicious decisions vis-a-vis regulation of continental natural resources ( e.g. exploration and settlement of western lands).

These are similar to the questions being raised by the smaller Pakistani Provinces today and the Pakistani provincial and national political leaders as well as the people themselves could learn a lot from the ratification debates that considered the two realities of 13 different countries vs. one large continential country and the issues of state vs. federal rights. It is also instructive to see how the continental leaders softly treaded the precarious landscape, making compromises and reaching the desired outcome, while at the same time respecting the soverign rights of the people of each former colony.

The debate hovered around many facets of the issue. Those, including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton (the Federalists), who had first experienced the difficulties of marshalling national resources (e.g. in the case of the revolutionary war) from a group of independent and soverign states that were not duty-bound to follow the federal government, argued in the favor of establishing a strong federal government, a national defense system, and a host of other administration instruments necessary to govern the vast expanse of the continent and fight another war--should England impose one on them. The contrary position was adopted by Thomas Jefferson and later James Madison (the anti-Federalists) who were staunchly in favor of state supremacy and rights and abhorred the notion of a strong federal government.

The "thirteen country" option, the Federalists argued, could result in the same geopolitical dynamic that marred intra-european relationships. What would stop these thirteen countries to start fighting from each other in the same way that European powers have been fighting with each other for centuries? What binds the people of these thirteen colonies with each other except the bond of a shared destiny against a common enemy and there was no reason to believe that it would remain so long after the end of the revolutionary war.

Indeed, there were already signs of strong political disagreements and even some military skrimishes between the individual states and there was little reason to believe that unless these states were bound together in a stronger bond, these small disagreements (e.g. on westward expansion, debts of the revolutionary war, relations with Indian tribes, foreign policy, and future of slavery etc.) would not result in full blown wars between the states.

Should these colonies be independent countries sometimes at war with each other and hence maintaining armies on their borders with each other, what would happen if a European power attacked the continental United States once again? Britain's retreat could have been temporary and, with enemy soldiers still on the soil, there was a likelihood that there would be some resumption in hostilities--a possibility that ultimately did materialize.

Wouldn't better defending the continental borders against a European invasion make more sense than diluting forces to man inter-state borders? Also, if the thirteen countries were to have their independent foreign policies, what would stop one (or more) of the thirteen to side with one of the European powers and provide it with a foothold on the continent from where to launch an attack on the rest of the colonies?

In the end, the arguments for a strong federal government that would have over-ride on several matters that were, until that time, considered rights of the soverign states won over those that favored strong state governments and a weak federal government. What was more important, however, was that the decision was reached by the peoples of the thirteen states themselves.

It is worth noting here that the founders of the American republic thought of this popular consensus as being so important to the long term viability of the republican experiment that they were willing to make extra-ordinary consessions--the most notorious being on the question of slavery that the North abhorred but tolerated to lure the South into the union. While this was beyond doubt a terrible wrong--one that would throw America into a civil war more than half-a-century after formation--it was important in that without it there would have been no America and no federal government to right the wrong of slavery!

The result, after a year of discussions and deliverations, and despite strong nationalist opposition, was that twelve of the thirteen states ratified the constitution within a year of its signing and hence United States of America was born. Once the constitutition came into effect, however, the states lost their soverignty as well as the right to unilaterally secede from the union. By the constitution of the United States, it became an act of treason for the citizens of a state to aid against or undermine the legal and constitutional authority of the federal government.

How does this relate to Pakistan\'s current political quagmire and the strained inter-provinicial and federal-province relations? While Pakistan's situation is clearly more complex today--after having spent 58 years in an unhappy union that resulted in the 1971 debacle--there are some commonalities. Many of the questions that were being raised of the American states in the 1780s are valid for Pakistani provinces today.

The talk of seccesion and liberation on the part of the smaller provinces is especially dangerous and irresponsible because it fails to address the question of what happens after that-- a question that was amply addressed in a democratic and thoughtful debate by peoples of the thirteen American colonies but is strictly forbidden speech for the fear of inciting revolution in Pakistan.

What would happen if Pakistan's territorial integrity is indeed compromised? Would Sindh or NWFP or Baluchistan survive on its own? Should Sindh take the unthinkable step in protest of Punjab's high-handedness over KBD, would it be able to guarantee any water for itself coming out of Punjab? Would an independent Sindh solve its own water problems? Would Punjab have access to the sea port that is as much a lifeline of its economy as it is Sindh's? If Pakistan is to disintegrate, what would refrains these provinces to engage in "water wars" with each other? What would stop other neighboring countries, India, Iran, or even Afghanistan, from taking advantage of that situation?

The result, after a year of discussions and deliverations, and despite strong nationalist opposition, was that twelve of the thirteen states ratified the constitution within a year of its signing and hence United States of America was born. Once the constitutition came into effect, however, the states lost their soverignty as well as the right to unilaterally secede from the union. By the constitution of the United States, it became an act of treason for the citizens of a state to aid against or undermine the legal and constitutional authority of the federal government.

How does this relate to Pakistan's current political quagmire and the strained inter-provinicial and federal-province relations? While Pakistan's situation is clearly more complex today--after having spent 58 years in an unhappy union that resulted in the 1971 debacle--there are some commonalities. Many of the questions that were being raised of the American states in the 1780s are valid for Pakistani provinces today.

The talk of seccesion and liberation on the part of the smaller provinces is especially dangerous and irresponsible because it fails to address the question of what happens after that-- a question that was amply addressed in a democratic and thoughtful debate by peoples of the thirteen American colonies but is strictly forbidden speech for the fear of inciting revolution in Pakistan.

What would happen if Pakistan's territorial integrity is indeed compromised? Would Sindh or NWFP or Baluchistan survive on its own? Should Sindh take the unthinkable step in protest of Punjab's high-handedness over KBD, would it be able to guarantee any water for itself coming out of Punjab? Would an independent Sindh solve its own water problems? Would Punjab have access to the sea port that is as much a lifeline of its economy as it is Sindh's? If Pakistan is to disintegrate, what would refrains these provinces to engage in "water wars" with each other? What would stop other neighboring countries, India, Iran, or even Afghanistan, from taking advantage of that situation?

Similarly, the center must not enroch over the rights of the provinces, as ordained in the constitution or even those promised at the time of independence. Whether it is the deadlock on NFC or the issue of federal and provincial subjects, an unhappy union can be worse than no union at all for it stunts the development of the country as a whole. The center must not see itself in a zero-sum game with the provinces and must develop a more confident, rather than insecure, national identity that is complimentary not a substitute for provincial nationalism. Whether we are all Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans before or after being Pakistanis would become immaterial if we all see Pakistan as being something that is greater than the sum of its parts and hence central to our dreams and aspirations as peoples.

When nationalists leaders raise the issue of Pakistan's territorial integrity, they talk as if nothing would be lost to them if Pakistan disintegrates into separate countries comprising different "nations". Nothing can be far from the truth. Pakistan, despite its shortcomings and defects, is greater than the sum of its parts. Every provinces gains from the union considerbly while at the same time contributing to it. Baluchistan provides natural resources to other three provinces. Sindh provides a port to the rest of the country. Punjab and NWFP contributes with its agriculture. Dividing Pakistan into separate countries would only eliminate these synergies and jeopradize the survival of each of the four provinces. It would expose them to the kinds of dangers that American republican leaders were aware of and worked so hard to avoid in the 1780s.

What then is the solution for Pakistan's interprovincial rivalries? An extra-constitutional option leading to a territorial split is clearly not an solution. Pakistan's four provinces and the federation must find answers to its problems within the country's broader constitutional framework. This would require genuine reconciliation, compromise, and sacrifice between provinces. The bigger province, Punjab, must take the lead in sacrifice like the elder brother does for his/her younger siblings. In turn, the smaller provinces must appreciate the sacrifice of the bigger province and make compromises in national interest. Politics is the art of making compromises. We should not let the best be the enemy of the good. If the country cannot reach a compromise (yet) on KBD, lets move forward with the Basha Dam on which all provinces agree upon and, in due course of time, and with greater trust and understanding between provinces, KBD would become a reality as well.

What was true of American states in the 1770s and 80s is true for Pakistani provinces today. We must hang together or else we would hang separately. Only by working together and with a spirit of reconciliation and sacrifice can we build a "more perfect union".

Athar Osama (athar.osama@gmail.com) is a Doctoral Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School for Public Policy in Santa Monica, CA.